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Abstract
This paper draws on the concept of bargaining theory to interpret contraceptive decision-making 
among women who express a desire to limit or space children. Bargaining theory assumes conflict in 
decision making within households and posits that such conflict is resolved through bargaining. 
Women’s bargaining power is said to increase with more control of resources. The underlying 
assumption is that household decisions are governed by economics. This paper acknowledges that 
economics may influence reproductive decisions, but posits that African social norms and institu-
tions are more important in defining conjugal roles than spousal relative economic contribution to 
family expenditure. Findings from seven African countries show that women who contribute more 
income to household expenditure are no more likely to adopt family planning as predicted by bar-
gaining theory. These results bring into question theoretical perspectives that are sometimes pro-
moted as generic explanatory models without validation in specific cultural settings. 
Keywords: Family planning, bargaining theory, decision-making, empowerment, contraceptive use 
Résumé
Cet article se sert du concept de la théorie de négociation pour interpréter la prise de décision con-
traceptive parmi les femmes qui expriment le désir de limiter ou d’espacer les naissances. La théo-
rie de négociation suppose qu’il y’a le conflit dans la prise de décision dans des ménages et avance 
qu’en principe ce conflit est souvent résolu par la négociation. En général, il est affirmé que le pou-
voir de la négociation des femmes augmente au fur et à mesure qu’elles ont plus des ressources à 
leurs dispositions. L’hypothèse fondamentale est que des décisions de ménage sont régies par des 
forces des marchés. Cet article reconnaît que les forces du marchés peuvent influencer des déci-
sions relative a la procréation, mais avance aussi qu’en principe les normes et les établissements 
sociaux africains sont plus importants dans la définition des rôles conjugaux que la contribution 
économique des épouses à la dépense de la famille. Les résultats basés sur les donnés de sept pays 
africains montrent que les femmes qui contribuent plus de revenu aux dépenses de leur ménage 
n’ont pas plus de tendances a adopter la planification familiale comme prévues par la théorie de 
négociation. Ces résultats mettre en questions les perspectives théoriques qui sont parfois 
favorisées en tant que modèles génériques explicatifs sans validation dans les milieux culturels 
spécifiques.
Mots clés: Planification familiale, théorie de négociation, prise de décision, émancipation, utilisation 
contraceptive
Introduction
This paper draws on the concept of bargaining 
theory to interpret contraceptive decision-mak-
ing among currently married women who 
express a desire to limit or space children. Con-
traceptive use rates remain relatively low in 
Africa despite increased awareness among the 
population of the availability of various modern 
methods of contraception. In Ghana, for exam-
ple, data from the 1993 Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) showed that about 90.7 
i.   Bawah, Ayaga A. <aab2161@cumc.columbia.edu>
http://aps.journals.ac.za 216
 African Population Studies 27, No 2, October 2013
percent of married women knew at least one 
method of modern contraception in 1993, but 
that only 10.1 percent were using modern con-
traceptives (Ghana Statistical Services and 
Macro International Inc. 1994). Subsequent 
DHS surveys reported a modest increase in use 
to about 13.3 percent and 24.2 percent in 1998 
and 2003, respectively (Ghana Statistical Serv-
ices and Macro International Inc., 1999; 2004). 
The 2008 DHS report for Ghana showed a 
slight reduction in modern contraceptive use 
(Ghana Statistical Services and Macro Interna-
tional Inc. 2009). This observation is similar 
across many African countries; in Uganda in 
1996, while 97.4 percent of married women 
reported knowledge of a modern method of 
contraception, only a mere 17.9 percent were 
currently using any modern method of contra-
ception. Similar observations are made for 
Kenya (96.4 knowledge of modern methods in 
the most recent DHS – 2008/9 – compared to 
28.0 percent currently using them); and 
Namibia (99.1 percent knew at least one mod-
ern method of contraception but 53.4 of mar-
ried women reported in 2006 that they were 
using a method. Similar observations are made 
for Mali and Burkina Faso, both included in the 
current analyses. 
The slow adoption of family planning in 
Africa despite almost universal knowledge of 
prevalent contraceptive commodities calls to 
question the success of the family planning pro-
grammes in sub-Saharan Africa. Several factors 
are reported as accounting for the slow pace of 
adoption of contraceptive use in Africa, includ-
ing traditions that promote deep-seated resist-
ance to family planning (Bawah et al. 1999; 
Rutenberg et al. 1997; Hulton et al. 2000), low 
female education (Martin 1995; Ainsworth, Bee-
ble and Nyamete 1996; Cleland, Ndugwa and 
Zulu 2011), and failed family planning policies 
(National Research Council 1993; Cleland, 
Ndugwa and Zulu 2011). 
Although DHS results from various African 
countries show wide variations in contraceptive 
use rates, countries in Western Africa tend have 
much lower contraception adoption rates com-
pared to those of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(Cleland, Ndugwa and Zulu 2011). Adoption 
patterns also vary by gender, with men often 
reporting more use than women, perhaps 
owing to multiple partner use. Differences in 
gender adoption rates may also result from dif-
ferent motivations with regard to men and 
women. Explanations given for the differences 
between husbands and wives focus on their dif-
ferent conjugal responsibilities with regard to 
child bearing and rearing and the social determi-
nants of demand for children. Although women 
bear the burden of childbirth and care and tend 
to want fewer children than men, their demand 
for contraception often remains latent because 
of spousal opposition to fertility regulation 
(Fapohunda and Rutenberg 1999; Bawah et al. 
1999; Blanc 2001).
 Two schools of thought have emerged to 
explain the discrepant reproductive aspirations 
of husbands and wives and the persistence of 
low contraceptive use and high fertility in sub-
Saharan Africa. Sociological explanations are 
grounded in notions of the determinants and 
consequences of marriage and family building, 
polygyny and religious traditions (Caldwell and 
Caldwell 1990). In this perspective, household 
economics are acknowledged to be important, 
but economic influences are linked to intergen-
erational wealth flows or to the consequences 
of agricultural practices and the economic value 
of children to the extended family (Caldwell 
1983). A widely accepted, but seldom tested, 
alternative view emphasizes household eco-
nomic theory as the dominant framework for 
reproductive decision-making within house-
holds (Rosenzweig 1990). The household model 
assumes that members agree to certain house-
hold management rules about the distribution of 
resources, including decision-making. Termed 
the “New Home Economics” model, this per-
spective assumes that behavior is altruistic and 
that household members cooperate in the inter-
est of the general good of all (Becker 1965 
1973). 
Elaborations of Becker’s theory are note-
worthy. For example, a widely cited perspective 
argues that household decisions are based on 
individual tastes and interests (Blood and Wolfe 
1960; Folbre 1984; Messer 1990; Engle 1990). 
Bargaining models emphasize conflict among 
family members and see resolution of such con-
flicts through a bargaining process (Blood and 
Wolfe 1960; Folbre 1984; Messer 1990; Engle 
1990; Tabitha et al. 2003; Lundberg and Pollak 
1993). According to Folbre (1984) households 
are constituted by a group of maximizing indi-
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viduals in which members cooperate and bar-
gain with a view to optimizing their personal 
interests. Bargaining power is thus affected by 
the ability of individuals to contribute to the 
household income through extra-familial 
sources. Other factors that enhance the bar-
gaining power of especially women include 
school attainment (Caldwell et al. 1992), sup-
port from the family of origin, the socio-cultural 
stratification of roles, as well as the individual’s 
skills or ability at bargaining (Blood and Wolfe 
1960; Bennett 1990). Other authors have 
emphasized the role of culture in defining 
household bargaining power and decision-mak-
ing processes (Conklin 1979; Strauss 1977). 
This paper tests the hypothesis that relative 
economic status of women in households 
explains contraceptive use in seven African 
countries. Within the context of this frame-
work, we would expect women who contribute 
more resources to household expenditure to 
have a greater say in the household decision-
making process, including demand for fertility 
regulation. The underlying assumption is that 
women who contribute more income or 
resources to the household are likely to wield 
more power in the household than those who 
contribute little or none at all, with relative 
authority translating into reproductive auton-
omy for women who are empowered to imple-
ment their preferences. Other sources of 
women’s power may include having higher edu-
cation, working outside the home, or having 
access to extrafamilial connections. The logic of 
this argument suggests that women with more 
income relative to their husbands or those who 
contribute more resources have a higher 
“threat point” of bargaining. The “threat point” 
defines the point at which the woman is willing 
to risk spousal conflict when bargaining with her 
husband. 
Is “bargaining theory” relevant to the 
African context? 
Bargaining theory as it is conventionally concep-
tualized may not be relevant to sub-Saharan 
Africa. Bargaining theory is premised on the 
assumption that household decisions are gov-
erned by economics and that the more 
resources one contributes to the household, the 
more power one is likely to wield. However, 
relative power may be defined by social institu-
tions that are unrelated to such contributions. 
Moreover, bargaining theory implicitly assumes 
that all decisions within the household are solely 
taken by the conjugal partners and governed by 
their collective and individual preferences and 
ultimately by the superior strength of the domi-
nant partner defined by resources. While this 
may be true in some cultural contexts, such 
notions may be alien to the sub-Saharan African 
context where marriage is constituted within 
patriarchy that tends to define roles between 
men and women. For instance, in many settings 
in sub-Saharan Africa, reproductive decisions 
may not be entirely governed by economics or 
may not be jointly taken. As Fapohunda and 
Todaro (1988) noted of West Africa, “… 
spouses do not necessarily follow joint house-
hold financial management practices.” For 
example, the decision to use or not use contra-
ception may or may not be jointly taken by a 
couple. Reproductive decisions are sometimes 
governed by social norms and institutions, 
which often give priority to the views and opin-
ions of men (National Research Council 1993), 
even if their contribution to the household 
expenditure or maintenance of the family is less 
than those of their wives. Also, because the 
marriage contract involves the payment of bride 
wealth, which in some sense constitutes com-
pensation to the bride’s family for her upbring-
ing and also for future children, reproductive 
decision-making is indirectly transferred to the 
male side (Caldwell and Caldwell 1990; Dodoo 
and Landewijk 1996). Thus, although a woman 
may contribute more than her husband to the 
household expenditure, decisions regarding her 
reproductive desires may still be subjugated to 
those of her husband. 
Moreover, some women may seek to fulfil 
their reproductive aspirations with strategies 
that are independent of the preferences of their 
husbands, leading in some instances to covert 
contraceptive use that would be opposed by a 
husband and his extended family if this practice 
were known (Biddlecom and Fapohunda 1998; 
Bawah et al. 1999; Woodsong 2004). It is plausi-
ble that women who want to control their 
reproduction and have the resources to afford 
the cost of adopting a contraceptive method 
without the support of their husbands or even 
their knowledge would do so. Under such cir-
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cumstances, women who have personal sources 
of income may be in a better position to imple-
ment their reproductive goals through covert 
use of contraception relative to women who 
lack the means to purchase contraceptives sup-
plies. Thus if a woman retains a greater propor-
tion of her earnings for personal use, then she is 
in a better position to adopt contraception than 
a woman who has no income at all, or one who 
commits most of her income to household 
expenditures. 
We argue that merely contributing more 
income to the household budget does not nec-
essarily empower women to take contraceptive 
decisions. Rather, cultural influences such as 
male preference for additional children and reli-
gion are important determinants of contracep-
tive use. Contraceptive use by women can 
precipitate spousal discord (Bawah et al. 1999). 
Women who earn income and are able to save a 
greater portion of that income for their personal 
use are in a better position to mitigate the 
social, familial, and spousal costs of contracep-
tion. 
Data and methods
DHS data from seven countries are used to test 
the hypothesis that bargaining power affects 
contraceptive use from seven African countries: 
Burkina Faso (2003; 2008), Ghana (2003; 2008), 
Kenya (2003; 2008), Mali (2001; 2006), Mozam-
bique (2003; 2008), Namibia (2000; 2006-7) and 
Uganda (2000; 2006). The DHSs are nationally 
representative surveys of women age 15-49 and 
men age 15-59. The DHS surveys use standard 
model questionnaires to collect comparable 
information on demographic characteristics of 
respondents, their reproductive statuses and 
intentions, breast-feeding practices, contracep-
tive use (both current and past), and a series of 
KAP-type (Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice) 
survey questions. Information is also collected 
on economic activities, including men and 
women’s work. 
The choice of countries was informed by 
whether or not the question from which the key 
independent variable is derived was included in 
the country’s instrument. However, the coun-
tries used here represent a good spread in 
terms of geographic region, level of develop-
ment and cultural diversity of sub-Saharan 
Africa.
Respondents were asked to indicate how 
much of their income (cash or kind) they con-
tribute to the expenditure of their household. 
Response categories included “Almost none”, 
“Less than half”, “About half”, “All”, and “None, 
her income is all saved.” We define a three-cate-
gory variable from these responses representing 
the proportion of income women contribute to 
the expenditure of their households: “none, 
income saved”, “less than half” and “more than 
half”. Since the outcome variable (an indicator 
for use of contraceptives) is dichotomous, we 
use a maximum likelihood logistic regression. 
Other variables to capture cultural influences 
are religion and relative preference of males for 
additional children. 
We also include controls for differences in 
ethnic background and region of residence to 
capture possible differences in the supply of 
contraceptives. The other variables in the model 
are husband’s and wife’s education, age of the 
women, place of residence (rural/urban), 
whether or not women current has more or 
less children than her ideal number. Finally, to 
adjust for relative household income, a principal 
component scale was estimated from poverty 
indicators to develop quintiles that are 
employed as independent variables. Unmarried 
women and women who were married, but 
temporarily separated from their husbands are 
excluded from the analysis. Women who indi-
cated that they are infecund are also excluded 
from the analysis since they are unlikely to use 
contraceptives for fertility control. 
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Data limitations
Examining the direct effect of relative income of 
men to women’s income on contraceptive use 
would constitute a more rigorous test of the 
bargaining hypothesis than models estimated in 
this analysis. DHS surveys do not collect infor-
mation on actual income levels for respondents. 
We have therefore used women’s contribution 
to household expenditure as a proxy indicator 
of relative bargaining power. This variable is 
widely used as an indicator of the measure of 
women’s empowerment (Hoddinott and 
Haddad 1995; Blumberg 1988). Also, note that 
the latter rounds of DHS did not collect infor-
mation on contribution of women’s expenditure 
to the household so we did not include the lat-
ter rounds of DHS data beyond the early 1990 
rounds in our primary measure that represents 
relative bargaining power. However, there were 
other variables that were collected in the latter 
rounds of the DHS that we thought could be 
used as proxies for relative bargaining power 
(e.g. women’s employment and earning of 
income) that we subsequently used and 
reported the results in the appendixes. Using 
those measure did not, however, alter the con-
clusions in any way. 
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows current contraceptive use (all 
forms) by background characteristics for all 
countries. Current use of modern contraceptive 
methods is also reported in brackets. There is a 
wide variation in use of family planning methods 
among the countries, ranging from 7.8% in Mali 
to 47.2% in Namibia. Traditional methods of 
contraception are more popular than modern 
methods as the inclusion traditional methods 
markedly increase contraceptive use rates. 
Table 2 Reasons for non-use of contraceptives among non-users and contraceptive decision-making 
in household 
. 
   Ghana Burkina Kenya Mali  Mozambique Namibia  Uganda 
    Faso 
 
Panel A: Reasons for not currently using any contraceptive method (percent of non-users) 
Not married  0.26 -  - 0.09 0.06 -  - 
Infrequent sex  6.75 11.08  3.99 4.26 4.40 4.09  5.80 
Menopausal, hyster 7.00 8.61  6.68 3.24 2.94 16.54  5.45 
Subfecund/infecund  13.75 11.60  10.82 5.87 16.18 12.45  19.24 
Want more children 14.77 18.68  15.43 17.59 48.14 22.37  9.84 
Opposed to it  5.21 5.78  9.06 21.12 6.00 12.45  3.78 
Opposed by husband 3.84 8.85  5.76 8.67 4.50 4.67  9.75 
Opposed by others 0.09 0.10  0.38 0.11 0.06 0.19  0.18 
Religion prohibits 4.01 3.17  24.33 6.13 1.31 3.89  4.04 
Knows no method 5.55 5.64  2.30 12.18 5.12 5.64  6.33 
Knows no source  2.48 11.71  0.77 5.44 1.87 0.58  3.43 
Health concerns  7.51 3.52  7.06 5.55 2.25 11.09  6.85 
Fear side effects  24.25 5.75  11.74 3.41 2.19 2.92  18.80 
Lack of access  0.77 0.66  0.31 0.61 0.78 0.78  1.05 
Costs too much  1.37 3.45  - 1.26 0.19 0.58  1.93 
Inconvenient to use 0.85 0.45  0.23 0.56 2.81 -  1.05 
Inconvenient to body 1.51 0.94  1.15 3.83 1.19 1.75  2.46 
 
 o of respondents 1,171 2,870  1,303 5,402 3201 514  1138 
 
Panel B: Decision-maker on contraceptives (% of respondents)
a
 
Mainly woman  15.60 37.13  29.18 43.81 24.20   37.76 
Mainly partner  11.82 10.59  10.59 19.30 10.87   11.65 
Joint decision  72.10 51.99  59.24 25.42 63.31   46.85 
Other   0.47 0.29  0.99 11.47 1.62   - 
 
 o of respondents 846 1360  1813 767 2033   1176 
 
a: this information is not available for Namibia 
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There is an inverted-U relationship between 
contraceptive usage and age, with the highest 
rates occurring among 30-39 year-olds. Use 
rates also vary by education, religion and place 
of residence. Women who have some form of 
education are more likely to practise family 
planning than those without any form of educa-
tion at all. For all countries except Burkina Faso, 
the likelihood of contraceptive use progressively 
increases with levels of education. Usage rates 
are also higher for women whose partners have 
some education compared to those whose part-
ners have no education. The likelihood of use 
also differs by religion. In Ghana, Mali, Mozam-
bique and Namibia Christians are more likely to 
use contraceptives than Moslems, while the 
opposite is the case in Kenya and Uganda. 
Contrary to the prediction of a bargaining 
model, women who retain their income for per-
sonal use are not more likely to practise family 
planning compared to those who report that 
they contribute a share of their earned income 
to the household expenditure. In Ghana, 
Mozambique and Uganda use rates fall monot-
onically as women contribute a greater share of 
their income to household expenditure. In the 
other countries, use rates rise marginally when 
women contribute less than half of their income 
but falls sharply when they contribute more 
than half of their income to household expendi-
ture. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that for most of the 
countries decisions about contraceptive use is a 
joint decision involving both partners. Panel A of 
Table 2 presents reasons for non-use of any 
family planning method. As expected, the most 
common reasons that married women do not 
currently use any contraceptive method (see 
table 2) are infecundity, menopause and desire 
for more children. In the regressions, we 
include an indicator for whether a women’s cur-
rent number of children is more or less than her 
desired number of children. The table also 
shows that cost of contraception is not a major 
reason for non-use. Fear of side-effects and 
health concerns related to contraceptives 
remain significant reasons for non-use. Almost a 
quarter (24.3%) of non-users in Ghana, 11.7% 
in Kenya and 18.8% in Namibia cite fear of side- 
effects while 7.5% of non-users in Ghana, 7.1% 
in Kenya, 11.1% in Namibia and 6.7% in 
Uganda cite health concerns. Opposition by 
husbands is prominent in Burkina Faso (8.9%), 
Mali (8.7%) and Uganda (9.8%). Other reasons 
for non-use include lack of knowledge on 
sources and methods and infrequent sexual 
activity. 
Regression results
Table 3 presents logistic regression odds ratios 
estimating the gross and net effects of the pro-
portion of women’s income contribution to the 
household expenditure on their likelihood of 
contraceptive use controlling for women, their 
partner and household characteristics. Also 
included in the regressions are variables that 
capture the effect of cultural influences on fertil-
ity control. All the regressions reported in this 
table include controls for region of residence 
and both wife and husband’s occupation. 
The results do not support the core hypoth-
esis of bargaining theory that women who con-
tribute disproportionally more resources to 
household expenditures are empowered to 
take contraceptive decisions. For almost all 
countries except Ghana there are no statistically 
significant differences in the likelihood of using a 
contraceptive among women who contribute 
contrasting fractions of their income to house-
hold expenditures. In fact, in the case of Ghana, 
women who contribute more than half of their 
income are significantly less likely to use contra-
ceptives relative to those who contribute noth-
ing. 
In the latter round of the DHS there was a 
question that captures women’s earnings from 
employment which we again used, comparing 
her earnings with that of her husband. We con-
structed a three category variable in a similar 
fashion as in the case of relative contribution to 
the household budget (Same as husband, More 
than husband and Less than husband). Again, the 
argument is that if the woman’s earning from 
her employment is more than that of her hus-
band, she is likely to have a stronger bargaining 
power to be able to implement her reproduc-
tive decisions. As before, results from this meas-
ure do not support the hypothesis (reported in 
Appendix Table A). Along similar lines of reason-
ing, we examined further earnings from employ-
ment where the woman reports that she is paid 
in cash. These results are reported in Appendix 
Table B. 
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Table 3 Logistic regression results predicting contraceptive use as a function of women’s contribution to household 






Contribution of woman’s income to household expenditure:
   None, income saved (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Some, but less than half 0.637** 1.037 0.938 0.928 0.706 1.233 1.204
   More than half 0.619*** 0.898 0.749 0.993 0.788 1.357 0.999
Education
   No education (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Primary 1.362** 1.502*** 1.294 2.960*** 1.316*** 1.528*** 1.166
   Secondary 1.602*** 2.546*** 2.312*** 5.531*** 1.846*** 2.401*** 2.082***
   Higher 2.000* 1.016 1.738 11.455** 1.615 2.750*** 2.769***
Wife's age
   15-19 (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   20-29 1.636 1.851*** 1.987*** 1.643** 1.498*** 1.166 0.993
   30-39 1.651 1.717*** 2.017*** 1.756*** 1.126 1.134 1.080
   40-49 0.834 1.473* 1.451 1.160 0.668** 0.831 0.605
Place of residence
   Urban (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Rural 1.047 0.626*** 0.652** 0.984 1.151 0.886 1.050
Religion
   Christianity (Ref) 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Islam  0.773* - 0.751 1.345 1.036 1.401 0.459*
   Traditional 0.463*** - - - - - -
Type of marriage
   Monogamous (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Polygamous 0.943 0.663*** 0.756** 0.914 0.848* 1.048 0.957
Household poverty quintile
   Poorest quintile (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  2nd quintile 1.037 1.227 1.371 1.263* 0.982 1.668*** 1.086
  3rd quintile 1.204 1.228 1.179 1.177 1.119 1.478** 0.943
  4th quintile 1.163 1.321* 1.108 1.726*** 1.333* 2.356*** 1.554*
  5th quintile 1.322 2.255*** 2.251*** 2.028*** 2.179*** 2.894*** 1.961**
Relative fertility preference
Want same no. of children (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Husband wants more 0.795* 0.593*** 0.787** 0.670*** 0.815** 0.658*** 0.943
Husband wants less 0.976 1.660*** 1.108 1.000 0.983 0.942 0.760
Current number of children of woman
More than desired (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Same or less than desired 0.491*** 0.659*** 0.565*** 0.711*** 0.497*** 0.551*** 0.459***
Other controls
Region of residence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wife’s occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Husband’s occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary statistics:
Number of observations 2387 4424 4107 2966 3418 2104 1502
Log Likelihood -1308.56 -1688.97 -1268.67 -1672.25 -1932.34 -1158.14 -895.39
Pseudo R2 0.0819 0.1696 0.1503 0.1836 0.1001 0.1360 0.1329
Wald Chi-square 204.97 597.54 429.57 515.36 381.67 299.96 231.15
% correctly predicted 71.55% 82.59% 88.14% 70.90% 70.19% 73.24% 67.64%
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 **p<0.001
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Here again, there is no evidence that if a woman 
earns cash from employment she is more likely 
to have the “power” to use contraception. 
Indeed, we find that in Uganda and Namibia the 
reverse is the case, where women who are not 
paid in cash have significantly higher odds of 
using contraceptive relative to those who report 
that they are paid cash from employment. 
However, what is consistent across all seven 
countries where the needed variables were col-
lected is the pervasive role of women’s educa-
tion. In all models, women’s education is 
consistently associated with significantly higher 
use of contraceptives, controlling for a battery 
of variables. 
The education effect is observed at all levels 
except in a few cases where primary education 
does not seem to matter (Namibia). Also, in the 
case of Burkina Faso and Mali, women’s educa-
tion beyond secondary level does not signifi-
cantly increase use (signs in right direction, 
nonetheless). Perhaps, this finding has to do 
with the fact that levels of education in both 
Burkina Faso and Mali are generally low, such 
that very few women even earn education 
beyond secondary level. 
In relation to household wealth, differences 
in contraceptive use exist largely between the 
extreme rich and extreme poor. The exceptions 
are Ghana and Uganda. In Ghana, relative 
household wealth has no impact on the likeli-
hood of contraceptive use. In Uganda, relatively 
wealthy households are monotonically more 
likely to use contraceptives. 
Our interpretation of the education and 
income results (bearing in mind that cost is not a 
factor in the decision to use contraceptives) is 
that effect of education on contraceptive use 
probably operates through the knowledge chan-
nel rather than the income channel and that 
adequate knowledge about contraception, 
especially modern methods, are acquired at the 
higher levels of education and that only rela-
tively wealthy households can afford these levels 
of education to obtain this knowledge.
Compared to urban areas, the odds of use 
are significantly lower in rural areas in Burkina 
Faso, Mali and Uganda but no differences are 
found for other countries. There are conflicting 
findings on the effect of religion on contracep-
tive use. In Ghana, Muslims and traditional wor-
shippers have lower odds of contraceptive use 
compared to Christians, but in Uganda Muslims 
are significantly more likely to use contraceptive 
compared to Christians. There are no significant 
differences in use by religion in the other coun-
tries. As expected, women who desire more 
children than they currently have significantly 
lower the odds of contraceptive use. 
Discussion and conclusion
The analysis has tested the hypothesis that 
women who contribute more resources to the 
family budget are more likely to use contracep-
tives because of enhanced chances of negotiat-
ing decisions with their husbands. The reasoning 
is that such women would have more leveraging 
in terms of better negotiating familial decision-
making because of their relative economic 
power. In other words, they will have higher 
bargaining power within the household in terms 
of decision-making, including those relative to 
reproductive choices. Our analysis attempted to 
test the relevance of bargaining theory within 
the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Contrary to 
expectations derived from bargaining theory, 
our findings from seven countries in the sub-
region suggest that women who contribute a 
greater share of income to household expendi-
ture or even earn more income than their hus-
bands are no more empowered to make family 
planning decisions than those who contribute 
nothing. In other words, household decision-
making and in this particular case the decision to 
use or not to use contraceptives is not necessar-
ily governed by economics. 
However, what is not in doubt is the role of 
education. Consistently, the results point to the 
fact that when women are educated, they are 
more likely to use contraceptives compared to 
those who are not educated. What this suggests 
is that education provides individuals with the 
tools and knowledge to make choices that they 
believe will advance their course. To put it more 
bluntly, it appears education is perhaps a better 
tool of empowerment than the dynamics of 
household economics. This is because education 
equips women with more knowledge that 
allows them to make rational choices including 
decisions related to the use of contraception. 
Also, we believe that decision-making within 
households is much more nuanced than just 
economic autonomy. In contrast to notions that 
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when women control more resources than their 
husbands they are more likely to dominate in 
household decision-making, we argue that Afri-
can social norms and institutions that define 
roles for males and females within marriage 
have significant influences on household decision 
making processes including contraceptive use 
(Caldwell and Caldwell 1987). Indeed, this is 
consistent with sociological theories linking 
behavior to African social norms and institutions 
that do not conform to Western household eco-
nomic theory. 
Our results are by no means conclusive on 
the determinants of women’s decision-making 
on contraceptive use or intra-household family 
planning decision-making dynamics in the sub-
region. However, our results support recent 
empirical research that suggest that attention be 
paid to cultural factors in modeling household 
decisions about contraceptive use and fertility 
preferences and outcomes in developing coun-
tries (Rasul 2008). Our results also bring into 
question theoretical perspectives that are some-
times promoted as generic explanatory models 
without validation in specific cultural settings. 
Tabitha et al. (2003) came to a similar conclu-
sion when they tested bargaining theory to 
female participation in agricultural household 
decision-making in Kenya when they noted “... 
our findings demonstrate that variables generally 
accepted and expected to empower women 
may apply to some regions of the world but not 
to others.” These findings suggest that policies 
and programs geared toward promoting family 
planning should be tailored to the particulars of 
local cultural norms. 
Thus, while the goal of promoting women’s 
livelihoods is certainly laudable and encouraged, 
it is not necessarily the case that women’s eco-
nomic autonomy will necessarily translate into 
the power to make household decisions, espe-
cially as they relate to reproductive decision-
making. In other words, efforts toward promot-
ing contraceptive use ought not be focused only 
on encouraging women’s economic empower-
ment, but rather should be directed toward 
promoting women’s education which is a better 
empowerment tool and also changes in the 
sphere of cultural beliefs and norms.
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Woman's earnings from employment
    Same as husband (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
    More than husband 0.939 1.332 0.818 0.869 0.871 0.884
    Less than husband 1.169 0.755 0.895 0.819 1.115 1.114
Woman's education
   No education (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Primary 1.538** 1.835*** 2.328*** 1.289 2.333*** 1.002
   Secondary 1.423* 2.577*** 3.872*** 2.221** 3.952*** 1.203
   Higher 0.545 2.844*** 3.443*** 2.375* 2.206*** 1.178
Woman's age group
   15-19 (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   20-29 1.703 2.973*** 2.748** 0.546 3.835*** 1.049
   30-39 2.005 3.611*** 3.778*** 0.580 3.612*** 0.775
   40-49 1.284 2.542*** 1.794 0.274*** 5.506*** 0.407
Place of residence
   Urban (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Rural 1.111 0.875 1.159 0.851 0.525** 0.799
Religion
   Christianity (Ref) 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 1.000 -
   Islam  0.852 - 1.634 0.475** 0.473 -
   Traditional 0.863 - - 0.720 - -
Type of marriage
   Monogamous (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Polygamous 0.768 0.783** 0.716* 0.821 0.834 1.380
Household poverty quintile
   Poorest quintile (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  2nd quintile 1.182 1.448** 2.012*** 1.973 1.335 1.408
  3rd quintile 1.178 1.804*** 2.737*** 1.899 0.867 1.236
  4th quintile 1.767* 2.432*** 3.435*** 2.893* 1.572** 2.233
  5th quintile 1.957** 3.166*** 4.105*** 3.785** 1.847** 2.129
Relative fertility preference
Want same no. of children (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Husband wants more 0.892 0.541*** 0.820 0.874 0.848 0.832
Husband wants less 1.378* 0.768 1.021 1.569 0.966 1.363
Current number of children of woman
More than desired (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Same or less than desired 0.638*** 0.580*** 0.764* 0.612** 1.033 0.541***
Other controls
Region of residence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wife’s occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Husband’s occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary statistics:












Log Likelihood -841.56 -1853.07 -918.07 -544.13 -985.40 -422.44
Pseudo R2 0.0496 0.1512 0.1363 0.1421 0.1460 0.1907
Wald Chi-square 87.64 546.46 225.82 156.57 269.09 47.61
% correctly predicted 72.84% 78.62% 69.49% 72.72% 75.44% 67.28%
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Appendix Table B: Results using indicator that woman is in employment that pays cash as measure of bargaining power 






Woman's earnings from employment
   Paid in cash (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Not paid/paid in kind 1.151 0.888 1.215 1.172 0.998 1.220* 2.574**
Woman's education
   No education (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Primary 1.463** 1.732*** 1.745*** 2.741*** 1.539** 1.667*** 1.273
   Secondary 1.364* 2.293*** 2.354*** 4.384*** 2.518*** 3.377*** 1.841**
   Higher 0.537 2.271** 3.496** 4.049*** 2.457** 2.617*** 1.599
Woman's age group
   15-19 (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   20-29 1.717 2.899*** 1.616* 2.817*** 1.296 2.222*** 0.878
   30-39 1.941 3.682*** 2.7780** 3.431*** 1.487 2.411*** 0.612
   40-49 1.159 2.351*** 0.973 1.758 0.749 2.469*** 0.365*
Place of residence
   Urban (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Rural 1.115 0.839* 0.765 1.043 0.694* 0.559*** 0.786
Religion
   Christianity (Ref) 1.000 - - 1.000 1.000 1.000 -
   Islam  0.850 - - 1.556 0.411*** 0.283*** -
   Traditional 0.884 - - - 0.692* - -
Type of marriage
   Monogamous (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.0000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
   Polygamous 0.698** 0.769*** 0.920 0.751* 0.924 0.887 1.062
Household poverty quintile
   Poorest quintile (Ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
  2nd quintile 1.243 1.268* 0.951 2.133*** 1.595 1.294* 1.173
  3rd quintile 1.285 1.391** 0.869 2.617*** 1.804* 1.155 1.062
  4th quintile 1.658* 2.124*** 1.451 3.045*** 2.743*** 1.517*** 1.798*
  5th quintile 1.899** 2.607*** 2.324*** 3.473*** 3.832*** 1.974*** 1.558
Relative fertility preference
Want same no. of children (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Husband wants more 0.914 0.521*** 0.726** 0.826 0.741** 0.789*** 0.720*
Husband wants less 1.465** 0.860 1.374 1.173 1.273 0.937 1.344
Current number of children of woman
More than desired (ref) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Same or less than desired 0.632*** 0.527*** 0.725* 0.776** 0.608*** 1.026 0.579***
Other controls
Region of residence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wife’s occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Husband’s occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary statistics:












Log Likelihood -962.77 -3454.85 -900.82 -1231.43 -936.11 -1834.35 -579.32
Pseudo R2 0.0563 0.1424 0.1463 0.1281 0.2180 0.1150 0.0752
Wald Chi-square 114.99 965.58 303.80 281.09 441.49 413.93 81.19
% correctly predicted 74.48% 82.34% 90.49% 68.32% 84.11% 77.89% 67.28%
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